Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

The decoy effect occurs when adding an inferior third option biases choice between two others, even though the decoy is rarely chosen. While robust in value-based decisions, evidence in perceptual tasks is mixed. Using the rhesus-macaque paradigm from Parrish et al. (2015), we tested whether a perceptual decoy effect generalizes to humans. Participants (n = 50) completed 400 trials. Contrary to our preregistered prediction, we found no reliable decoy effect. Accuracy improved on the hardest trials (Level 1) when a decoy was present, response times were slower in decoy conditions than baseline, and accuracy was higher for tall versus wide rectangles, consistent with the vertical-horizontal asymmetry. The relatively wide spacing of stimuli may have reduced grouping and attentional clustering; because spacing was not manipulated, this remains a hypothesis for future tests. Results suggest that context effects in perceptual choice operate under narrower boundary conditions than in value-based domains.

Motor and declarative memory systems have been traditionally considered distinct. However, a study by Mosha and Robertson (2016) reported striking evidence of generalisation between motor and declarative learning. Specifically, learning improved if the current task (e.g. motor sequence) shared the same high-level ordinal structure as an earlier task (e.g. word list), demonstrating cross-domain transfer of unstable memories. This finding has significant implications for our understanding and conceptualisation of memory taxonomies but has not been replicated. Here, healthy adult participants (N = 125) completed a word list and motor sequence task in counterbalanced order with either a shared or distinct sequence structure. In contrast to Mosha & Robertson (2016), we found that a shared ordinal structure between the declarative and motor sequence tasks did not facilitate performance. Overall, our results challenge the robustness of cross-domain generalisation, and underscore the complexity of cross-memory interactions.

Humans have the metacognitive capacity to be aware of what they do and do not know. While uncertainty monitoring has long been regarded as uniquely human, researchers in search of the polygenetic root of this ability have gathered evidence that primate species possess functional features parallel to humans. However, there were no systematic studies that quantitively take into account of extant data for these non-primate animals. Through a meta-analysis, we collected published data reported in 11 articles from 55 individual non-primate animals spanning over four species on the "opt-out" paradigm, the most prevailing paradigms used to test nonhuman animals uncertainty monitoring. We used chosen-forced advantage and opt-out rate to quantify animals performance results for computing the aggregated effect size for this literature. We found that these four NPA species process a significantly positive effect size for both scores and identified the moderators that have contributed to the inconsistencies across these studies. Implications for theories on metacognition are discussed.

The ability to generate novel creative ideas (divergent thinking) is closely linked with our ability to imagine novel future events (episodic simulation). Here, we employed an individual differences approach to examine whether divergent thinking and episodic simulation are differentially associated with episodic and semantic retrieval ability. In response to object word cues, participants generated meanings and definitions (semantic memory), remembered a past event (episodic memory), imagined a novel future event (episodic simulation), or generated novel uses (divergent thinking). Replicating previous findings, divergent thinking ability was predicted by the number of episodic details generated during episodic simulation. When directly comparing episodic and semantic memory, the strongest predictor of divergent thinking was semantic memory. In contrast, episodic simulation ability was predicted by both episodic and semantic memory. We interpret these findings as support for the semantic scaffold hypothesis of imagination, according to which semantic memory provides the necessary scaffold or framework for flexible expressions of cognition such as divergent thinking and episodic simulation. As episodic simulation, relative to divergent thinking, was associated with both episodic and semantic retrieval, these findings are taken to reflect common reliance on event construction processes recruited during both episodic remembering and imagining.

Adults have been shown to consistently remember and forget certain images despite large individual differences, suggesting a population-wide sensitivity to an images intrinsic memorability--a measure of how successfully an image is remembered. While a decade of research has focused on image memorability among adults, the developmental trajectory of these consistencies in memory is understudied. Here, we investigate by what age children gain adultlike sensitivity to the image memorability effect. We utilized data from Saragosa-Harris et al. (2021), where 137 children aged between 3 and 5 years old encoded animal-scene image pairs and then after a 5-minute, 24-hour, or 1-week delay performed a cued recognition task for each scene target given its animal cue. We tested adults memory of the same scene images using ResMem (Needell & Bainbridge, 2022), a pre-trained deep neural network that predicts adult image memorability scores, and using an online behavioral continuous recognition task (N = 116). Results showed that ResMem predictions, as a proxy of adults memory, predicted scene memory of children by the age of 4 and were the most predictive of childrens memory across ages after a long, 1-week delay. Children at age 3 show non-adult-like consistent memory patterns, implying that the non-adult-like memory patterns were not due to poor memory performance. Instead, 3-year-olds may have consistently used certain visual memory strategies that become less optimal as they age. Our results suggest that adult-like sensitivity to image memorability emerges by the age of 4 through experience. Public Significance StatementThis study strongly suggests that children older than 4 years old tend to remember and forget the same images as adults. We recommend teachers and caregivers to utilize the ResMem DNN to select memorable images to be used in educational settings.

Over past couple of decades our understanding of visual working memory (VWM), and working memory in general, has been predominantly in line with the capacity debate. We recently opened a new line of inquiry regarding the recall of a single object to go beyond the capacity debate, and showed that a series of feature probe questions about a single object yields poorer recall later in the sequence (Sengupta et al, 2020). In the current work we focused on another aspect of sequential feature recall - mainly regarding whether recall can be improved by asking the same question twice. To that end, we chose to focus on two features - color and location, and we contrasted repeat and non-repeat (from the standpoint of feature questions) trials in a series of two experiments. In repeat trials either color or location would be probed twice consecutively. In non-repeat trials color and location probes were presented one after the other in random order. In all trials the stimulus was a small colored oriented line presented for 1 sec in a location within 4o of visual angle. The recall of color and location were mapped onto continuous variable like Sengupta et al, 2020 - for instance, color recall was mapped onto a color wheel. In the first experiment, we used an unaltered color wheel when the color question was repeated. For the second experiment, we used a rotated color wheels for two consecutive color recall trials. We observed an increase in recall error for both repeat and non-repeat condition for location when the probe was at the second question in both experiments. However, color recall error did not increase for second repeat question condition in Experiment 1 as opposed to the non-repeat condition. On the other hand, in Experiment 2 we observed the expected increase in recall error for both repeat and non repeat condition for color probe at the second question. This maybe due to the fact that participants used an anchoring strategy in Experiment 1 by remembering where they clicked on the color wheel in the first question. The rotation of color wheel in second experiment destroys the anchor leading to the aforementioned result. The results show that trying to recall the same feature again leads to degradation of recall accuracy for both color and location, and human beings may use different strategies for recall in working memory tasks.

Theories of embodied language hold that word processing is automatically accompanied by sensory and motor simulations. For example, when you read the word sun, a sensory simulation of brightness as well as a motor simulation of pupil constriction would be automatically triggered. Consistent with this notion, Mathot, Grainger, and Strijkers (2017) found that the eyes pupil was slightly smaller after reading single words that were associated with brightness (e.g. sun) as compared to darkness (e.g. night); that is, the pupil light response was modulated by the semantic brightness of words. However, (other) key findings within the field of embodied language have proven difficult to replicate, and we therefore felt that it was crucial to replicate the effect of semantic brightness on pupil size. To this end, we conducted a close-but-non-identical replication of two key experiments from Mathot, Grainger, and Strijkers (2017): one experiment with visually presented words, and one experiment with spoken words. Both experiments were successfully replicated. We propose that cognitive modulations of the pupil light response reflect activity in visual brain areas; therefore, the effect of semantic brightness on pupil size can be used as a marker for the involvement of visual brain areas in language processing, and thus to address a wide variety of key questions within psycholinguistics.

Visual working memory (VWM) is traditionally studied while constraining eye movements and limiting access to visual input, yet in natural vision humans constantly explore and resample their environment. Only a few studies have examined VWM utilization when participants were allowed to interact with the environment and found that participants often preferred to resample their environment rather than rely on VWM storage. However, since eye movements were not controlled in these studies, the link between VWM utilization and free visual exploration remained unknown. In two experiments (N = 40), we investigated how visual exploration shapes reliance on VWM versus perceptual input. Participants searched for a common target across two item sets and could either store multiple items for comparison or repeatedly resample the sets by switching between them. Results revealed that when switching was achieved through eye movements, participants consistently relied more on visual resampling and less on VWM; in contrast, when switching required a manual response, they shifted toward greater VWM use. This pattern persisted even when peripheral input was equated, suggesting that natural exploration through eye movements reduces the cognitive cost of acquiring visual information, leading to a strategic reduction in VWM use. Our findings challenge fixation-based approaches to VWM research and highlight the importance of studying cognition under ecological viewing conditions.

According to deficit models, early life adversity disrupts normal development, leading to long-term emotional, behavioural, and cognitive difficulties. However, some evidence suggests that certain psychological skills may be preserved or even enhanced by early adversity. We hypothesised that implicit learning and memory would be equally effective in individuals exposed to childhood adversity and those from more favourable backgrounds, and compared the effects of childhood versus adult adversity. To this aim, retrospective childhood harshness and unpredictability measurements and current perceived socio-economic status were collected in a sample of 325 participants at a Hungarian university taking part in an online experiment. They also completed a task allowing the assessment of multiple components of implicit statistical learning, including initial acquisition of regularities, consolidation of established regularities, resistance of established regularities against interference, and acquisition of novel regularities. Results showed that although statistical learning reached the same eventual level, its pace was quicker in individuals with relatively greater early life adversity exposure. Conversely, lower current socio-economic status was linked to reduced learning performance. These findings partially support the hidden talents framework, suggesting that early adversity may promote certain adaptive cognitive skills.

Working memory (WM) serves as a neurocognitive system responsible for temporarily storing and manipulating information when its source has disappeared. Previous investigations into whether features within the same dimension were stored separately or conjoined into objects have yielded conflicting findings. Based on increasing evidence on the adaptivity of the working memory system, we conjectured that the format in which objects from the same dimension are stored in Visual Working Memory (VWM) might be contingent on the specific task demands, and subtle distinctions across experiments may account for the disparities in results. In the current study, we introduced modifications to the paradigm used by Luck and Vogel (1997) and Wheeler and Treisman (2002), where the same paradigm led to different conclusions, to assess whether implicit task requirements could influence the storage format of objects in visual working memory. In two conditions, we manipulated the relevance of conjunction between two colors by varying the proportions of Mis-conjunct probes, a probe type depending on conjunction information for accurate responses. The results showed that in both conditions, performance was primarily determined by the number of features rather than the number of objects, aligning with the results of Wheeler and Treisman. Nevertheless, we observed that Mis-conjunct probes, which require conjunction information, exhibited improved performance when tested more frequently. This suggests that the format of retention in working memory, whether in separate or conjoined form, is influenced by the task demands.

The anticipation of extrinsic reward facilitates memory formation. However, it is unclear how reward following memory retrieval influences the information that is retrieved and later remembered. Here, we conducted four behavioral experiments (N=42 male/female young adults per experiment) in which we manipulated retrieval practice reward delivery. Across all experiments, participants studied word-image pairs and then completed two rounds of retrieval practice, followed by a final recognition test. Participants made vividness judgments during retrieval practice and in three of four experiments each response had a 50% chance of yielding positive feedback. We find that repeated rewards following retrieval practice facilitate later memory whereas low vivid retrieval practice impairs later memory. Together, these results suggest that the benefit of both retrieval practice and reward may be dependent on the strength of the memory that is retrieved.

The ability to store information in visual working memory is essential to plan and successfully execute memory-guided actions in natural human behavior. Typically, visual working memory research investigates how storing affects subsequent action. In doing so, however, the importance of how the action affects prior storing remains underappreciated. Therefore, we here question how the required precision for an action to succeed, affects how relevant visual information is encoded, maintained and finally acted on. To this end, we had participant memorize 1, 2 or 4 colors for delayed continuous report. Crucially, we manipulated how (im)precise the report was allowed to still be marked correct. Behavioral results showed that for actions with higher required precision, reports became more precise, but only when one or two colors were memorized. Also, reports became slower with higher required precision, regardless of the number of colors. By leveraging pupillometry, we further showed that with higher required precision, 1) colors were encoded deeper (since pupils constricted more during presentation), and 2) more effort was exerted to maintain the colors (since pupils dilated more during retention). Moreover, we found that participants kept exerting more effort to be precise (with increasing precision requirements), even when additional effort did not result in better performance anymore. Our findings demonstrate that humans consider their intended actions when encoding and maintaining information in visual working memory. Our results highlight the essential role of action in understanding how visual information is stored during natural goal-directed behavior. 242 words

When attempting to recall previously seen visual information, people often move their eyes to the same locations where they initially viewed it. These eye-movements are thought to serve a role in enhancing memory retrieval, although the exact mechanism underlying this effect is yet unknown. To investigate this link between eye-movements and memory, we conducted an experiment with 80 adult participants. Participants were asked to perform a memory retrieval task, while viewing either the same visual context as during encoding or an altered one. Results showed that the benefit of eye movements to memory retrieval was dependent on the visual input. This suggests that the contribution of eye-movements to memory may not be from the motor behavior itself, but from its visual consequences. Our findings thus challenge the hypothesis that eye movements act as a motor retrieval cue and support the view that their visual consequences act as a sensory one. Statement of RelevanceAn intriguing question in cognition is how humans encode memorized material and what helps them retrieve it. It is known that when an action or stimulus is repeated both when information is encoded and when it is retrieved, this can act as a retrieval cue and enhance memory performance. It is also known that people tend to reenact the same eye movements during retrieval as they did during encoding, and this behavior is associated with higher memory performance. This has led to the hypothesis that eye movements act as a retrieval cue. However, we challenge this hypothesis by showing that the visual consequences of eye movements, rather than the motor action that accompanies them, is the key factor for memory enhancement. Understanding the factors that influence memory provides crucial insight into the relationship between external behaviors and internal memory processes, leading to significant implications for the educational and clinical settings.

Previous work has shown that humans distribute their visual working memory (VWM) resources flexibly across items: the higher the importance of an item, the better it is remembered. A related, but much less studied question is whether people also have control over the total amount of VWM resource allocated to a task. Here, we approach this question by testing whether increasing monetary incentives results in better overall VWM performance. In three experiments, subjects performed a delayed-estimation task on the Amazon Turk platform. In the first two experiments, four groups of subjects received a bonus payment based on their performance, with the maximum bonus ranging from $0 to $10 between groups. We found no effect of the amount of bonus on intrinsic motivation or on VWM performance in either experiment. In the third experiment, reward was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis using a within-subjects design. Again, no evidence was found that VWM performance depended on the magnitude of potential reward. These results suggest that encoding quality in visual working memory is insensitive to monetary reward, which has implications for resource-rational theories of VWM.

Studies on confidence in decision-making tasks have repeatedly shown correlations between confidence and the characteristics of motor responses. Here, we show the results of two experiments in which we manipulated the type of motor response that precedes confidence rating. Participants decided which box, left or right, contained more dots and then reported their confidence in this decision. In Experiment 1, prior to confidence rating, participants were required to follow a motor cue. Cued-response type was manipulated in two dimensions: task-compatibility (the relation between response set and task-relevant decision alternatives), and stimulus-congruence (spatial correspondence between response key and the location of the stimulus that should be chosen). In Experiment 2, a decision-related response set was randomly varied in each trial, being either vertical (task incompatible) or horizontal (task-compatible, spatially congruent and incongruent). The main results showed that choice confidence increased following task-compatible responses, i.e. responses related to the alternatives of the choice in which confidence was reported. Moreover, confidence was higher in these conditions, independently of response accuracy and spatial congruence with the correct stimuli. We interpret these results as suggesting that action appropriate in the context of a given task is an indicator of successful completion of the decision-related process. Such an action, even a spurious one, inflates decisional confidence.

Although we can all agree that interference induces forgetting, there is surprisingly little consensus regarding what type of interference most likely disrupts memory. We previously proposed that the similarity of interference differentially impacts the representational detail of color memory. Here, we extend this work by applying the Validated Circular Shape Space (Li et al., 2020) for the first time to a continuous retrieval task, in which we quantified both the visual similarity of distracting information as well as the representational detail of shape memory. We found that the representational detail of memory was systematically and differentially altered by the similarity of distracting information. Dissimilar distractors disrupted both fine- and coarse-grained information about the target, akin to memory erasure. In contrast, similar distractors disrupted fine-grained target information but increased reliance on coarse-grained information about the target, akin to memory blurring. Notably, these effects were consistent across two mixture models that each implemented a different scaling metric (either angular distance or perceived target similarity), as well as a parameter-free analysis that did not fit the mixture model. These findings suggest that similar distractors will help memory in cases where coarse-grained information is sufficient to identify the target. In other cases where precise fine-grained information is needed to identify the target, similar distractors will impair memory. As these effects have now been observed across both stimulus domains of shape and color, and were robust across multiple scaling metrics and methods of analyses, we suggest that these results provide a general set of principles governing how the nature of interference impacts forgetting.

Visual working memory allows for the brief maintenance of information to serve behavioral goals. It has been shown that when the specific action required to serve a future goal is predictable, people can flexibly change a visual memory representation to incorporate an action-based one, demonstrating the goal-oriented nature of visual working memory. Can such flexibility also be observed within the visual domain, between color and space? In this eye-tracking study, participants remembered either a centrally presented color or a spatial position around fixation. Critically, when remembering a color the response wheel was either randomly rotated, or shown at a fixed rotation, on every trial. When fixed, every target color could be associated with a predictable position on the wheel during response. Do people incorporate this added spatial information in their behavior? Participants utilized color-space associations when remembering color: Response initiation happened faster when the color wheel was fixed compared to random, irrespective of whether an action could be planned or not. Next, we showed that gaze was biased towards the position of the spatial memory target during the delay, extending previous work on gaze biases. Importantly, also when remembering a color, gaze was biased towards the anticipated position of that color on the response wheel when it was fixed. Together, our results show a behavioral benefit of added spatial information for color memory, and systematic changes in gaze that reflect flexible utilization of space.

Humans order numbers in space from left to right, with smaller quantities represented preferentially in the left hemispace and larger ones in the right hemispace. The direction of this mental number line (MNL), or more generally of number-space associations (NSA), is influenced by cultural habits such as reading and writing direction. However, a growing body of evidence from pre-verbal infants and non-human animals suggests that number-space mappings may also have biological foundations. In non-human primates, evidence for a directional MNL remains mixed, partly due to small sample sizes and methodological heterogeneity. Here, we tested samples of rhesus (Macaca mulatta) and crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis) across two experiments using spontaneous food-related tasks. In Experiment 1, monkeys chose between identical food quantities (1x1 to 24x24) presented on the left and right. No systematic spatial choice bias emerged as a function of numerical magnitude, and hand use did not differ across exact numerical pairs, although exploratory analyses revealed magnitude-related modulations of manual responses. In Experiment 2, monkeys were habituated to small (4x4) or large (16x16) quantities and subsequently tested with the alternative quantity. Result showed significantly more leftward choices following numerical decreases (16[->]4) and more rightward choices following numerical increases (4[->]16), indicating that relative numerical context, rather than absolute magnitude, elicited directional spatial biases. These findings suggest that in macaques, number-space associations emerge most robustly in comparative contexts involving expectancy violations of magnitude.

Cognitive overload can impair professional scepticism in high-stakes contexts such as auditing. In these settings, sustaining professional scepticism is essential. Default nudges, or pre-selected options, may offset these effects by reducing cognitive demands. We conducted two online experiments to examine how cognitive load and default nudges influence professional scepticism in auditing decisions. Experiment 1 validated a dot memory task manipulation of cognitive load and identified low and high load conditions for subsequent testing. Experiment 2 embedded this manipulation in Phillips audit task, used for measuring professional scepticism in audit. Results showed that cognitive load slowed responses and reduced accuracy. Default nudges accelerated responding and improved accuracy under load, but only when aligned with the most probable response; misaligned nudges reduced accuracy. These findings suggest that defaults act as conditional scaffolds under cognitive strain, supporting judgment and decision-making in some contexts but introducing risks in others. Misaligned defaults reduced accuracy, indicating that they can exploit intuitive responding rather than enhance deliberation.

As decisions require actions to have an effect on the world, measures derived from movements such as using a mouse to control a cursor on a screen provide powerful and dynamic indices of decision-making. In this first of a set of two studies, we replicated classic reach-decision paradigms across computers, tablets, and smartphones, we show that portable touch-devices can sensitively capture decision-difficulty. We see this in pre- and during-movement temporal and motoric measures across diverse decision domains. We found touchscreen interactions to more sensitively reflect decision-difficulty during movement compared to computer interactions, and the latter to be more sensitive before movement initiation. Paired with additional evidence for the flexibility and unique utility of pre- and during-movement measures, this substantiates the use of widely available touch-devices to massively extend the reach of decision science. We build upon this in the second study in this series (Bertrand et al., 2023) with the use of webcam eye-tracking to further elucidate, earlier in time, the decision process. This subsequent work provides additional support for tools that enable remote collection of rich decision data in ecologically-valid environments.